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Vertical Acquisition and Section 7
of the Clayton Act
Jason C. Blackford
Utilizing the topic of vertical acquisition as the subject of his discus-
sion, Mr. Blackford argues that the government and certain courts have
erred in blindly applying strict legal criteria to test the validity of acqui-
sitions without considering the economic ramifications of these combina-
tions. After an historical analysis of the development of the current legal
tests, the author demonstrates how these tests often yield a result incon-
sistent with that reached through an economic analysts. He concludes
that these inconsistencies demand a re-evaluation of current methods of
testing vertical acquisitions and makes concrete suggestions for reform.
. ERTICAL ACQUISITION is a method of integrating a business
enterprise through the purchase of assets or stock, or by the
merger of various levels of operations in the extraction, production,
distribution and consumption of goods. Horizontal acquisition is a
combination of units on the
same tier of any of these levels.
THE AUTHOR (B.A., Denison Univer- Both of these methods of in-
sity, LL.B., Yale Umversity) is a prac- tegration, as well as conglomer-
ticing attorney in Cleveland, Ohio. ate acquisitions, are subject to
the prohibitions of section 7 of
the Clayton Act.'
This article will analyze the legal and economic effects of an
application of the guidelines of section 7 to vertical mergers. First,
an examination will be made of the development of the legal tests
under section 7 Second, the discussion will undertake an analysis
of the economic and social consequences of vertical acquisitions.
Finally, consideration will be directed to the development of pos-
sible guidelines and new concepts in evaluating the vertical acquisi-
tion of economic power.
The topic of vertical acquisitions has been selected for two rea-
sons. First, vertical acquisitions illustrate the need to develop sepa-
rate legal tests for different types of industrial combinations. Some
authorites have applied the principles developed for horizontal
integration to the significantly different problems presented by ver-
tical acquisitions.'
Secondly, vertical acquisitions demonstrate the failure of current
164 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964)
2 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
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antitrust policy to consider economic results, such as price changes,
output and technological progress. In order to achieve a rational
antitrust policy towards vertical mergers, the legal tests under sec-
ton 7 must not be at variance with economic thought. It is sub-
mitted that such a dichotomy of law and economics currently exists
and must be eliminated.
A recent case, United States v. Alummium, Ltd.,3 is illustrative
of the use of section 7 of the Clayton Act to prevent an industrial
combination which presumably would have been economically ben-
eficial. Aluminium, Ltd., the world's largest producer of primary
aluminum, had arranged to acquire the assets of the Bridgeport Brass
Company Metals Division of the National Distillers and Chemical
Corporation and National Distiller's stock interest in two joint ven-
tures in the aluminum fabricating field. Bridgeport Brass is a major
fabricator of aluminum siding and awnings and is the nation's larg-
est manufacturer of aluminum venetian blinds. The government
sought an injunction to prevent the consummation of the acquisition.
The attorneys for the Justice Department, proceeding under section 7
of the Clayton Act, alleged that the acquisitions would eliminate
Bridgeport as a potential competitor of Aluminium, Ltd. in the pri-
mary aluminum market and would eliminate Alumnum, Ltd. as a
potential competitor in the aluminum fabricating market. The gov-
ernment also claimed that the existence of a large integrated com-
pany in the traditionally fragmented aluminum fabricating field
would have a detrimental effect on competition.
The attack on this transaction is not surprising in view of the
constant assaults by the government on the aluminum industry in
recent years4 but the wisdom of this particular attempt is question-
able in light of the evidence introduced by Aluminium, Ltd. and
Bridgeport. Affidavits were submitted by the defendants in opposi-
tion to the government's motion for a preliminary injunction.5 The
affidavits stated that first, Bridgeport's market share of total alumi-
num shipments in 1963 was only 0.9 per cent - miniscule when
compared with Alcoa's 32 per cent and Reynold's 20 per cent; sec-
ondly, it was noted that Bridgeport had been consistently operating at
3 TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.) 5 71366, at 80569 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 1965)
(preliminary injunction).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 299 Fed. 361 (3d Cir. 1924);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
5 Brief for Defendant National Distillers & Chem. Corp., Appendix B, United States
v. Aluminium, Ltd., TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.) 5 71366, at 80569 (D.NJ.
Jan. 5, 1965) (preliminary injunction.)
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a loss because it lacked its own reduction plant, and sufficient alu-
mina capacity and bauxite reserves. Bridgeport did not have sufficient
assets to acquire or to construct these facilities. Thus, to prohibit
this sale might lock Bridgeport into a series of losses or force Nation-
al Distillers to expend vast sums to integrate Bridgeport vertically
by use of its capital. On the other hand, Aluminium, Ltd. has had
difficulty in reaping the benefits of the world's largest market for
fabricated aluminum because of the vertical integration of the ex-
isting domestic aluminum producers. The district court apparently
found sufficient merit in these factors to dissolve the temporary re-
straining order and deny the preliminary injunction on the stipula-
tion by Aluminium, Ltd. that it would operate Bridgeport separately
until the legality of the acquisition was determined.6
The economic considerations surrounding the Alummium, Ltd.
purchase are certainly persuasive of the justification for the transac-
tion. However, under the legal tests of the Clayton Act as developed
by the courts, it is arguable that the acquismon was illegal. Certainly,
in this area, law and economics ought to be akin. How the disparity
between them developed is revealed by a study of the evolution of
the criteria currently applied in determining the legality of a verti-
cal acquisition.
I. PRE-1950 JUDICIAL REGULATION OF VERTICAL
ACQUISITIONS
The concept that a vertical combination might in itself be sub-
ject to government regulation is a relatively recent development in
antitrust law In fact, no case prior to 1947 could be said to have
involved this issue. The first decision involving vertical mtegra-
tion, Unted States v Yellow Cab Co.,7 was presented to the Su-
preme Court after the trial court had dismissed the government's
petition for failure to state a cause of action under sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act.' In addition to manufacturing taxicabs, the
Checker Cab Manufacturing Company controlled smaller companies
which provided taxi service in several metropolitan areas. The
Court agreed with the government's contention that an arrangement
by which the operating companies agreed to purchase their require-
ments from Checker illegally foreclosed other taxicab suppliers from
664 Star. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
7 322 U.S. 218 (1947). It is of interest to note that the Government eventually
lost this case as it was found that sound business judgment had motivated the purchase
of the affiliated corporation's cabs by the operating tax companies.
8 Unted States v. Yellow Cab Co., 69 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ill. 1946).
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a large part of the market. In addition, Justice Murphy stated that
such an agreement might further restrain trade by preventing the
affiliated operating compames from purchasing cabs in a competitive
market' Consequently, if this integration were found to be a calcu-
lated plan to restrain trade or to create monopoly power, then it
would constitute a violation of the Sherman Act."0 Thus, the Yel-
low Cab decision first introduced the element of market foreclosure
as a prohibited practice.
The first application of the foreclosure concept to vertical acqui-
sitions was in United States v. Columbia Steel Corp." The United
States Steel Corporation had purchased the Consolidated Steel Cor-
poration, the leading fabricator of steel products on the West Coast,
in order that the latter might serve as an assured outlet for the steel
shapes and plates produced by U.S. Steel's giant Geneva plant. The
government's complaint alleged that:
Upon consummation of said purchase the business now owned
by Consolidated and its subsidiaries will be permanently eliminated
as a substantial market for the rolled steel products of producers
other than Columbia and other wholly-owned subsidiaries of US.
Steel. Said business now owned by Consolidated will also be per-
manently eliminated as a competitor with U.S. Steel and Columbia
in the manufacture and sale of fabricated steel products in the
Consolidated market.
The necessary effect of said agreement is to eliminate sub-
stantial competition in the sale of rolled steel products and the
manufacture and sale of fabricated steel products and said agree-
ment is therefore in itself an unreasonable restraint of trade and
commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 12
In its brief the government argued that the precedent established in
United States v. Yellow Cab Co.'3 rendered an acquisition per se il-
legal when a substantial portion of the market was foreclosed by any
vertical integration scheme.'4 The Supreme Court avoided this issue
by stating that the Yellow Cab case had come before the Court on a
motion to dismiss and therefore the only question before the Court
in that case was the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the
government's complaint. The Court concluded that the acquisition
of Consolidated Steel did not unreasonably restrict the opportunities
9 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1947)
LO26 Star. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
11334 U.S. 495 (1948)
12 Complaint, United States v. Columbia Steel Corp., supra note 11.
1332 U.S. 218 (1947)
14 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 28, 32, United States v. Columbia Steel Corp., 334 U.S.
495 (1948).
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of competitive producers of rolled steel to market their products.
The Court stated that the consumption of rolled steel by Consoli-
dated Steel was less than 3 per cent of the rolled steel sold in the
area where Consolidated marketed its products. 5 However, the
Court appears to have been in error in its definition of the relevant
market in which to determine the competitive effect of the acquisi-
tion.'" The eleven-state area in which Consolidated sold its products
was not relevant when it was the sales to Consolidated that were
being foreclosed.
An important effect of the Columba Steel case was to give a
new impetus to Congressional efforts to amend the antitrust laws to
prevent concentrations of economic power by corporate acquisitions.
II. THE CELLER-KEFAUVER AMENDMENT TO SECTION 7
The old section 7 of the Clayton Act was applicable only to
acquisitions that lessened competition between the merging corpora-
tions." Prior to 1950, section 7 provided:
[T]hat no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capi-
tal of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the
effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competi-
tion between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the
corporation making the acquis ton, or to restrain such commerce
in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of
any line of commerce.'8
This section was originally aimed at preventing holding companies
from growing into "trusts" by acquiring stock in competitors and
thus exercising industry-wide control." Administrative and judicial
construction, of the original section 7 strictly limited the applicabil-
ity of the statute to acquisitions which: (1) involved direct competi-
tors in a horizontal line of commerce;2" (2) had a substantial effect
'5 United States v. Columbia Steel Corp., 334 U.S. 495, 508-09 (1948). The element
that was never mentioned in the opinion, yet implicit in every word is the feeling that
the Government was estopped from attacking this acquisition because of the Govern-
ment's post-war insistence that U.S. Steel should purchase the Geneva steel complex
and because an assured market for the products of that plant was a necessity to insure
the profitable operation of that plant.
16 Ibid.
1738 Stat. 731 (1914).
18 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)
.9S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
20 See [1929] FTC ANN. REP. 6-7; Hearings Before Subcommittee 3 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., set. 10, at 38 (1949); Handler &
Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 629, 652 (1961). But see, United States v. E.. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 353 U.S. 586, 591 (1956).
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upon competition in the line of commerce;"1 and (3) operated to
overpower the attempts of other firms to compete on an equal
basis.22
In 1950, these restrictions were eliminated by the enactment of
the Celler-Kefauver amendment to section 7." The amended statute
provides:
[That] no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the as-
sets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly24
The amendment effected three major changes in section 7 (1) the
extension of coverage to acquisitions of assets; (2) the elimination
of the requirement that competition between the acquired and the
acquiring corporations be substantially lessened; and (3) the substi-
tution of the market concept of "any line of commerce" for the
phrase "in any community."
The enactment of the Celler-Kefauver amendment was the result
of intense Congressional and administrative efforts to overcome the
deficiencies inherent in the original statute. The legislative history
of the amendment reveals two main congressional motives: first,
to "plug the asset loophole"2 of the original section, and second, to
subject corporate mergers to advance approval by the Federal Trade
Commission.27 In formulating the provisions of the amendment,
21 rnternational Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
22 Ten ple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FrC, 51 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1931)
23 Annmerger Act of December 29, 1950, 64 Star. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
24 lbud.
25 An excellent summary of the legislative history of § 7 may be found in MAIN,
MERG S AND THE CLAYTON AcT 221-53 (1959).
26 As originally enacted, § 7 did not apply to the acquisition of the assets of one
corporation by another. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1961).
The legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment dearly indicates that this
loophole was a prune target of the Actes sponsors:
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to prevent corporations from
acquiring another corporation by means of the acquisition of its assets, where-
under (sic] the present law it is prohibited from acquiring the stock of said
corporation. Since the acquisition of stock is significant chiefly because it
is likely to result in control of the underlying assets, failure to prohibit direct
purchase of the same assets has been inconsistent and paradoxical as to the
over-all effect of existing law. S. Rnp. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1950).
2 7 Handier & Robinson, supra note 20.
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the legislators were not as concerned with the possibility of market
foreclosure through vertical acquisition as they were with the in-
creasing economic concentration resulting from horizontal mergers.
As part of a study of economic concentration, the Federal Trade
Commission stated in a 1947 report that although acquisitions and
economic concentration were increasing, few of the acquisitions were
in industries that were already concentrated." On the subject of
vertical acquisitions, the report stated:
Vertical integrations have a particularly severe effect upon small
business during periods such as the present which are plagued by
shortages of raw materials, components, etc. During such periods,
large firms frequently reach backward to acquire important sup-
pliers, and in so doing, reduce the amount of supplies available
for small independent business 29
Viewed as a whole, however, the 1947 report considered the vice
of vertical arrangements to lie in the attendant increase in economic
concentration rather than in the foreclosure of sources of supply or
the elimination of outlets for goods. A subsequent 1948 report of
the Commission was even more vigorous in its attack on increased
economic concentration; in fact, the report argued that any merger
which would result in such an increase in concentration was against
public policy " The 1948 minority report of the House Judiciary
Committee criticized the FTC study for its emphasis upon the
amount of concentration and its apparent disregard for the effects
of mergers on prices, employment and production efficiency."
However, the final report on H.R. 273432 which amended section
7 did not reiterate this criticism, although in the committee hearings
on the bill neither the Federal Trade Commission nor any other
witness introduced evidence as to the effect of mergers on prices,
employment and efficiency "
28 FTC, The Present Trend of Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, S. Doc. No. 17,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1947).
2 9Id. at 12.
30FrC, THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT 6-7 (1948)
3 1 H.R. REP. No. 596, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1949) (minority report) The criti-
cism of the F1TC study is supported by a study undertaken by the Tax Research Program
of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. A summary of this study
may be found in Lintner & Butters, Effects of Mergers on Industrial Concentration,
1940-1947, 32 REV. OF ECONOMIcS & STATISTICS 30 (1950) A series of replies
and counter-replies to the Harvard Study may be found in 33 REV. OF ECONOMICS &
STATISTICS 63 (1951)
3 2 H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
33 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, pt. 1 (1949)
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The final house report specifically included vertical acquisitions
within the ambit of the amendment:
Because section 7, passed in 1914, prohibited, among other things,
acquisitions which substantially lessened competition between the
acquiring and the acquired firm, it has been thought by some that
this legislation applies only to the so-called horizontal mergers.
If, for example, one or a number of raw material producers pur-
chases firms in a fabricating field (i.e., a "forward vertical" acqui-
sition), and if as a result thereof competition in that fabricating
field is substantially lessened in any section of the country, the law
would be violated, even though there did not exist any competition
between the acquiring (raw material) and the acquired (fabri-
cating) firms. 34
The Congressional debates do not, however, specifically refer to the
concept of foreclosure in vertical situations, but emphasize instead
the horizontal effects of integration."3 Professors Handler and Rob-
inson summarized the legislative history of amended section 7 as
follows:
Conclusions from the legislative history. These conclusions
emerge from the legislative history of the amended section 7-
(1) The defect that spawned the amendment was the 1914 stat-
ute's "asset loophole", it was Congress's undeviating concern to
subject asset acquisition to Clayton Act regulation. (2) Efforts
to engraft standards of per se illegality on this corrective legisla-
tion were abortive. (3) Instead, the original substantive criteria
were revised to make clear (a) that all acquisitions between com-
peting companies would not be banned; (b) that, per contra, it
was unnecessary to go to the opposite pole and prove an actual un-
reasonable restraint of trade or monopolization, as under the Sher-
man Act, and (c) that the congressional intent was to steer a mid-
dle course between these two extremes, whereby legality would
turn on whether a substantial lessening of competition or a ten-
dency to create a monopoly was reasonably probable. (4) The
fate of an acquisition was to be determined, not by dollar amounts,
percentages, or other shorthand formulae, but on a case-by-case ex-
amination of all matters evidencing the acquisition's, likely impact
on the vigor of competition. 6
It is imperative to recognize that the particular problems of vertical
integration were not prominent in the studies and discussion pre-
ceding the enactment of amended section 7 The analyses of the
amendment's congressional proponents and the Federal Trade Com-
mission were directed instead at concentration on the horizontal
level. This distinction will take on added importance in the sub-
34 H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1949)
3'- Cf. MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 25, at 252-54.
36 Handler & Robinson, supra note 20, at 664.
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sequent discussion of whether economic concentration is a proper
test of the legality of a vertical acqtusiton.37
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
AMENDED SECTION 7
A. Pre-Brown Shoe Decisions
At the present time, the only authoritative interpretations of the
merger provisions of section 7 are administrative and judicial de-
cisions. While there was no definutive decision involving vertical
acquisitions under the amended section 7 prior to 1957, several cases
involving horizontal mergers indicated the possible direction of fu-
ture decisions on the legality of vertical acquisitions. 8
The 1953 decision in In the matter of Pillsbury Mills, Inc.39 in-
volved an acquisition with both vertical and horizontal elements.
There, one of the largest suppliers of flour acquired the assets of two
corporations thereby increasing its manufacturing capacity and its
marketing position in the southeastern part of the country. In dis-
cussing section 7's prohibition against acqusitions which "substan-
tally lessen competition," the court refused to equate the meaning
of this term with that of the identical phrase in section 3 of the
Clayton Act.4" The Commission stated that the standard to be ap-
plied under section 7 could not be specifically determined but rather
could only be described as laying somewhere between the per se
doctrine and the rule of reason.4 The standard of proof under the
Clayton Act was ruled to be less strict than that required by the
Sherman Act because the former statute was designated to prohibit
Sherman Act violations in their incipiency. The Commission fur-
ther stated: (1) that an economic analysis must be made of the in-
dustry and of the effect of the acquisition on competition, not com-
petitors, within the industry; and (2) that no single characteristic of
an acquisition of itself would be sufficient to determine the effect
on competition. 2 Thus, in order to prove a violation of section 7,
the government was required to show more than that the resultant
combination controlled a substantial amount of sales and affected a
87 See text accompanying notes 96-97 infra.
3 8 Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D.C. Conn.
1953), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1954); In the Matter of Farm Journal, Inc., 53
F.T.C. 26 (1956).
39 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953)
40 Id. at 563.
41 Id. at 569.
421d. at 571.
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substantial portion of commerce. The Commission indicated that
an economic analysis of the effect of the acquisition on competition
should be undertaken to determine the legality of the integration.
Emphasis was directed toward the impact on competition rather than
the effect on specific competitors.
In 1957, the Columbu Steel case43 still remained as the leading
case on vertical integration. However, in that year the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in United States v. E. L duPont de
Nemours Co. 4 The government had instituted an action directed
at forcing duPont to relinquish its 23 per cent stock interest in Gen-
eral Motors Corporation.45 The main contention was that duPont
was using its stock ownership to increase its sales of automobile fin-
ishes and fabrics to General Motors. Both the government and the
defendants argued the case in the Supreme Court as a Sherman Act
question and made only passing reference to the original section 7
of the Clayton Act. However, the Court did not feel so restricted
and proceeded to apply the original terms of section 7 to vertical
acquisitions. By way of justification the majority opinion stated:
The first paragraph of § 7 [old], written in the disjunctive, plain-
ly is framed to reach not only the corporate acquisition of stock of
a competing corporation, where the effect may be substantially to
lessen competition between them, but also the corporate acquisition
of the stock of any corporation, competitor or not, where the effect
may be eAther to (1) to restrain commerce in any section or com-
munity, or (2) tend to create a monopoly of any line of com-
merce.46
The opinion also cited statements by Senator Chilton on the floor
of the Senate to substantiate this interpretation.47 Mr. Justice Burton
in his dissent challenged the research of the majority with his anal-
ysis of the legislative history of the original Clayton Act:
The remarks of Senator Chilton relied upon by the majority
do not indicate that he thought that § 7 was applicable to vertical
integrations. His statements indicate merely that he thought that
the restraint and monopoly clauses of § 7 were not entirely synon-
ymous with the substantially lessenng competition clause 48
In his review of the Congressional debates on the original Clayton
43 Umted States v. Columbia Steel Corp., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
44353 U.S. 586 (1957).
4 5 It should be noted that the action was instituted prior to the passage of the Celler-
Kefauver amendment. Thus, the Court applied the provisions of the former § 7.
4 6 Unted States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590-91 (1957).
47 Ihu.
48Id. at 614 n.5 (dissent).
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Act, Justice Burton found only one reference to the problem of ver-
tical integration. Senator Reed had proposed an amendment to
stiffen the provisions of the act and Senator Chilton inquired
whether the amendment would prevent a manufacturer of steel from
acquiring a corporation that mined iron ore. Senator Reed answered
negatively- "But I call the Senator's attention to the fact that if the
illustration he uses woul& not be covered by the language of my
amendment it certainly would not be covered by the language I
seek to amend."4
After ruling that the original section 7 applied to the facts in
the duPont case, the Court was then faced with interpreting the old
provisions. Mr. Justice Brennan, in the majority opinion, stated that
the government had established a violation of section 7 when the
evidence demonstrated that (1) the market affected was substantial
and that (2) there was a likelihood that competition may be fore-
dosed in a substantial part of that market.5" Since duPont did sup-
ply quantitatively and percentage-wise, a large share of General
Motors' requirements, the Court concluded that there was suffiaent
market foreclosure to permit an inference of injury to competition.
The application of this foreclosure test is quite similar to the fore-
closure analysis arising under the proscriptions of section 3 of the
Clayton Act5 against contractual vertical arrangements. "2 Fore-
closure in this decision was used in a vertical sense since concentra-
tion in the horizontal market structure was not involved. The vol-
ume of the purchases by General Motors was sufficiently great to
support a finding of a substantial foreclosure of sales outlets of du-
Pont's competitors. The stock acquisition was therefore ruled to be
for the purpose of allowing duPont to entrench itself as the primary
supplier of General Motors' requirements for automotive finishes
and fabrics and was declared a violation of section 7
The foreclosure criterion was used in a different context in a
subsequent vertical acquisition decision, United States v Bethlehem
Steel Corp.5" The case arose out of the government's claim that
Bethlehem's purchase of the assets of Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Company violated amended section 7 Since Bethlehem was inte-
grated into several steel fabricating fields not occupied by Youngs-
49 51 CONG. REc. 14455 (1914) (remarks of Senator Reed)
50 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours Co., 353 U.S. 586, 591 (1957)
5138 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
52 See Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J.
1, 69-70 (1959)
53 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
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town, Bethlehem's competitors in the fabricating field would be de-
prived of Youngstown as a source of supply and as a market for
products which were also made by Bethlehem.54 In finding that
this fact would yield certain competitive advantages to Bethlehem,"a
the district court used the following example:
From a competitive standpoint the most desirable source of rope
wire for a non-integrated wire rope company is a rope wire manu-
facturer, such as Youngstown, which produces its own wire rods
and which does not compete in the manufacture and sale of wire
rope. The competitive disadvantages to the independent wire rope
fabricator of purchasing rope wire from a competitor are: (1) in
a period of shortage of rope wire a competitor-supplier may sup-
ply his own needs first; (2) the competitor-supplier, as a sales
argument against the independent, may point to the latter's de-
pendency upon him, the supplier, for raw materials; (3) if the
independent sells wire rope below his competitor-supplier's price
for wire rope he may lose his source of supply, thus giving his sup-
plier a form of price control over him; and (4) the opportunities
for a price squeeze on the independent are enhanced, since the sup-
plier may shift his profit between rope wire and wire rope in such
a manner as to narrow or eliminate the independent's margin of
profit on wire rope.5r6
It should be noted that the court adopted the foreclosure argument
in terms of protecting competitors of Bethlehem, rather than mak-
ing a quantitative analysis of the foreclosure as was done in duPont.
The court did not refer to possible increases in concentration in the
lines of commerce where Bethlehem was a fabricator. The empha-
sis was dearly on the protection of competitors.
In his delineation of the relevant market the district court judge
refused to allow any concepts of product flexibility to expand the
scope of the relevant market; product flexibility was restricted to
cases brought under the Sherman Act."7 Since foreclosure under the
market concentration test (quantitative foreclosure) or under the
competitor protection concept depends upon the existence of alter-
nate sources of supply and outlets, the existence of interchangeable
product substitutes is crucial. The exclusion of substitute products
in determining the relevant market or line of commerce permits the
application of section 7 to relatively small firms which are never-
theless dominant in a highly specialized field."8
54M. at 611-12.
55 Id. at 592.
5s Id. at 612-13.
57d. at 594 n.34.
58Id. at 593 n.36.
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In two other cases"s prior to the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States," lower courts were
confronted with the question of whether foreclosure was to be meas-
ured by a quantitative analysis of the effect of the acquisition on a
horizontal level or construed as an anticompetitive device which
would injure competitors.
The effect upon competitors was the primary focal point of the
court's opinion in United States v Maryland & Va. Milk Pro-
ducers Assn."i An agricultural co-operative of over 2,000 dairy
farmers in Maryland and Virginia, which produced and marketed
milk on the wholesale level, purchased Embassy Dairy, their only
significant competitor in the District of Columbia. Embassy mar-
keted the milk from 120 independent dairymen who were horizontal
competitors of the co-op and who had cut deeply into co-op sales
in Washington. By the purchase of Embassy, the co-op effectively
eliminated its competitors' means of distribution, thereby foreclos-
ing them from the market. To protect the competitors of the co-op,
the court held that the acquisition was illegal. It should be noted
that this purchase by the co-op would have been ineffective as a
foreclosure device if entry into the wholesale market could have
been accomplished with relative ease, for in such a case a new com-
petitor could then have replaced Embassy.
In United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,62 a manufacturer
of community antennas sought to purchase a series of community
television systems throughout the nation. In its defense, Jerrold
asserted that these purchases were for investment purposes and vig-
orously resisted the government's examination. First, the district
court inferred an evil motive on the part of the defendant because
of its un-cooperative attitude when requested to provide certain in-
formation. The court concluded that the acquisitions must have
been for the purpose of providing captive customers for the parent
corporation. Second, with respect to the resulting foreclosure, the
court made the following analysis:
5 9 United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd per curam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Pro-
ducers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958), af'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). See also
A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cit. 1962); Scott Paper Co. v.
FTC, 301 F.2d 579 (3d Cit. 1962); Crown Zellerback Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800
(9th Cir. 1961)
60 370 U.S. 294 (1962)
61 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958), afW'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
62 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curami, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
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Section 7 of the Clayton Act does not make every acquisition of a
buyer by a seller unlawful, even though there is a reasonable proba-
bility that the acquired concern will purchase its requirements from
its owner in the future. There must be a reasonable probability
that the acquisition will have the condemned effects of substan-
tially lessening competition or tendency to create a monopoly.
This determination is extremely difficult to make when each ac-
quisition forecloses only a small segment of the market.
Yet at some point the cumulative effect of these acquisitions will
reach the prohibited proportions. 3
Thus, foreclosure was not evaluated by any resultant competitive
advantages; rather the amount of the foreclosure on a horizontal
level was determinative. Since the acquisition was the start of a
trend toward horizontal accumulation of power, the court found sec-
tion 7 to be violated.
B. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States - A Summary and Analysis
The most authoritative decision on the subject of vertical mte-
gration is Brown Shoe Co. v United States. 4 The Brown Shoe
Company, a leading manufacturer of shoes and a large retailer of
the same product, merged with G. R. Kinney Company, Inc., also
a manufacturer and a large retailer of shoes.65 The government
claimed that both the vertical and the horizontal aspects of the
merger were m violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. As to
the malevolence of vertical arrangements, the Supreme Court stated:
The .primary vice of a vertical merger or other arrangement tying
a customer to a supplier is that, by foreclosing the competitors of
either party from a segment of the market otherwise open to them,
the arrangement may act as a 'dog on competition' which 'de-
prive(s) rivals of fair opportunity to compete.' Every extended
vertical arrangement by its very nature, for at least a time, denies
to competitors of the supplier the opportunity to compete for part
or all of the trade of the customer-party to the vertical arrange-
ment. However, the Clayton Act does not render unlawful all such
vertical arrangements, but forbids only those whose effect 'may be
to substantially'lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly'
in any line of commerce in any section of the country.66
631 d. at 566.
64 370 U.S. 294 (1961).
65 At the time of trial, Brown Shoe Co. operated thrty shoe factories and controlled
1230 retail outlets. It was the fourth largest shoe manufacturer in the United States,
accounting for 5% of domestic shoe production. In the five year period prior to
1956, Brown Shoe had acquired seven companies engaged solely in the manufacture of
shoes. The other partner in the acquisition, Kinney, was the twelfth largest shoe manu-
facturer, producing one-half of one per cent of all shoes in the United States. Kinney's
360 retail stores accounted for 1.6% of shoe sales in the nation.
66 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962) (Citations omitted.)
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The Court then undertook an economic analysis of the merger with
the emphasis on four major factors. First, the amount of the fore-
closure was analyzed.6"
Since diminution of the vigor of competition which may stem from
a vertical arrangement results primarily from a foreclosure of a
share of the market otherwise open to competitors, an important
consideration in determining whether the -effect of a vertical ar-
rangement "may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly" is the size of the share of the market fore-
closed. However this factor will seldom be determinative.
If the share of the market foreclosed is so large that it approaches
monopoly proportions, the Clayton Act will, of course, have been
violated; but the arrangement will have also have run afoul of the
Sherman Act. And the legislative history of § 7 indicates clear-
ly that the tests for measuring the legality of any particular eco-
nomic arrangement under the Clayton Act are to be less stringent
than those used in applying the Sherman Act. On the other hand,
foreclosure of a de mmmus share of the market will not tend 'sub-
stantially to lessen competition.'
Thus, the Court held that foreclosure in a quantitatIve amount on
a horizontal level was one of the tests of illegality under section 7
It assumed that sufficient foreclosure would substantially lessen
competition. The amount of foreclosure sufficient to make an ac-
qusition unlawful was found to depend in part upon the distribu-
tion of economic power throughout that level and the extent of
prior integration. There should be no consideration of whether
economic consequences of the foreclosure are detrimental or bene-
ficial, but rather a strict quantitative analysis of the foreclosure.
Second, a brief examination of the business purposes motivating
the merger was made by the court.69 The primary purpose of this
psychoanalysis of the acquisition was to keep the "failing firm"
test a viable escape route. Apparently, the onus of illegality is re-
moved from an acquisition if the financial difficulty of one of the
participants is of such magnitude as to cause the possible elimina-
tion of this firm from competition unless the acquisition is per-
mitred. This requires an estimate of the seriousness of the firm's
plight balanced against the potential harm resulting from the
presence of an integrated competitor in the failing firm's line of
commerce.
Next, the Court directed its attention to the degree of existing
concentration and the trend toward centralization within the in-
6T1d. at 328-29.
68 Ibul.
6 9 Id. at 331.
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dustry.7° "In an industry as fragmented as shoe retailing, the con-
trol of a substantial share of the trade in a city may have important
effects on competition. If a merger achieving five percent control
were now approved, we might be required to approve future
merger efforts by Brown's competitors seeking similar market
shares."'" The Court warned that once a trend toward concentra-
tion develops, any acquisition will be suspect. However, illegality
will be found only when a substantial part of the line of commerce
is foreclosed or affected adversely Although this approach is sim-
ilar to the quantitative foreclosure analysis, it is somewhat different
in that a structural examination was made of the trend within the
entire industry. Therefore, whether the units within the relevant
line of commerce are small and non-integrated or are large and inte-
grated becomes an important consideration.
The last factor examined by the court was the economic ef-
ficiency and potential price reduction which might result from a
vertical acquisition.72 However, these economic consequences were
held to be irrelevant to the question of the legality of a vertical
acquisition.
The retail outlets of the integrated companies, by eliminating
wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from the
manufacturing divisions of the enterprise can market their brands
at prices below those of competing independent retailers. Of
course some of the results of large integrated or chain operations
are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered un-
lawful by the mere fact that small independent stores may be ad-
versely iffected. It is competition, not competitors, which the Act
protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to pro-
mote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned business. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs
and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented mdus-
tries and markets. It resolved these considerations in favor of de-
centralization.73
All economic consequences except for market structure were re-
jected. The Court refused to formulate a legal balancing process
by which the benefits-of the acquisition could be weighed against
its detrimental effects. In support of this position, the Court
relied upon the admonitions against concentration contained in the
70Id. at 332.
71 Id. at 343-44.
72 1d. at 344.
73 1bd.
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legislative history of the original Clayton Act and the 1950 amend-
ment.
74
The approach taken in Brown Shoe represents a modified "rule
of reason" which is to be applied m determining the legality of an
acquisition under section 7 The term "rule of reason" is appropri-
ate since emphasis is placed upon the amount of the foreclosure and
the degree of concentration. The rule of reason is "modified,"
however, since the emphasis of the Court's analysis is directed at the
effect on market structure rather than toward an 'evaluation of the
economic consequences of the acquisition. The specific legal guide-
lines relating to vertical acquisition which can be extracted from
the Brown Shoe decision may be summarized as follows:-
(1) The doctrine of Yellow Cab7 is reaffirmed in that vertical in-
tegration is not per se illegal. (2) The vice of a vertical acquisi-
tion lies in the foreclosure of markets and sources of supply. The
extent of the foreclosure is determined by a study of the quantity of
foreclosure on a horizontal tier and not by an evaluation of the
effect upon competitors. (3) The "percentage" test of market fore-
closure is not a controlling element in determining the legality of
a proposed vertical acquisition. A vertical acquisition will not be
saved by the fact that the resulting combination forecloses a small
percentage of the relevant market. (4) Economic efficiency and
reduced prices for consumers will not protect a vertical acquisition
from the thrust of the new section 7 of the Clayton Act. (5) It is
apparent that the Supreme Court, at least as presently constituted,
will apply section 7 to stop in its incipiency any discernible trend
toward oligopolistic competition.
C. Vertical Acquisitions After Brown Shoe - Confusion and
Uncertainty
The post-Brown Shoe decisions have failed to adhere to the
guidelines established in that decision and considerable confusion
has resulted. Interpretations by the lower courts7 and the Justice
Department77 together with the decision of the Court in United
States v Aluminum Co. of America 8 (Rome Cable) have con-
74 1d. at 315.
75332 U.S. 218 (1947).
7sUnted States v. National Steel Corp., TRADE REG. REp. (1965 Trade Cas.)
71375, at 80604 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 1965)
77 Umted States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
78377 U.S. 271 (1964).
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tributed to that confusion. In the latter case, the government in-
sutured an action to void Alcoa's acquisition of the stock and assets
of Rome Cable, a manufacturer of wire and cable products. The
trial court, after a review of the industry, the structure of the market,
the factor of foreclosure, the purpose of the acquisition, and the
effect of the combination on competition found that section 7 was
not violated. 9 The trial judge followed the teachings of Brown
Shoe with precision and correctly applied this lesson to the facts.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for divestiture on two
grounds: (1) the trial court's definition of line of commerce was
ruled to be too narrow, and (2) the acquisition was found to have
substantially lessened competition. With respect to the latter point,
Justice Douglas, in writing for the majority, relied upon the test
of concentration within an industry as developed in United States v.
Philadeiphza Nat'l Bank8" (a horizontal acquisition)
It would seem that the situation in the aluminum industry may be
oligopolistic. As that condition develops, the greater is the likeli-
hood that parellel policies of mutual advantage, not competition,
will emerge. That tendency may well be thwarted by the presence
of small but significani competitors. Though percentagewise Rome
may have seemed small in the year prior to the merger, it ranked
ninth among all companies and fourth among independents in
the aluminum conductor market Rome's competition was
therefore substantial Preservation of Rome, rather than its
absorption by one of the giants, will keep it 'as an important com-
petitive factor,' to use the words of S. Rep. No. 1775 [81st Cong.,
2d Sess.] p. 3. 81
The Supreme Court did not consider the purpose of the acquisition
or the absence of foreclosure, but rested its opinion solely on the
necessity to keep small competitors in the market. The question
then arises: does this opinion supersede the rule of reason as stated
in Brown Shoe? It is submitted that this case is outside the judicial
mainstream since it applies a horizontal market structure test as the
sole criterion of legality for a vertical acquisition. This case might
be used in the future as a precedent for a government position that
79 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
80374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
81 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280-81 (1964) The
Justice Department has continued its attack on the acquisition trend in the aluminum
industry. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Mo.
1964), Alcoa acquired the leading fabricator of aluminum curtain walls which con-
trolled 16.6% of that market. Tis case, although vertical in nature, did not turn on
foreclosure but rather the court based its holding on the avowed purpose of Alcoa to
obtain 40% of the marker. It was this horizontal concentration in the fabricating tier
that was condemned.
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resultant size of the merger is sufficient for illegality under sec-
tion 7
A court of appeals decision in United States v. Kennecott
Copper Corp.82 is more in line with the principles of Brown
Shoe. There, Kennecott sought to acquire Okonite, the second
largest independent producer of insulated wire and cable. Kenne-
cott was an integrated miner, miller, smelter and refiner of copper,
but engaged in little fabricating. Prior to the acquisition Kenne-
cott was not a supplier of Okonite, but the court presumed that af-
ter the combination Okonite would be a "captive" fabricator for
Kennecott. The elimination of this large independent fabricator
was not only sufficient foreclosure to warrant sanction under sec-
tion 7, but was part of a trend toward concentration in the wire
and cable fabricating field. The court viewed market structure as
an objective of antitrust policy, rather than as an analytical tool
for determining the effect of the acquisition on competition. The
result of this decision has been to insulate the integrated competi-
tors of Okonite from the competitive pressure which would have
resulted had the company been allowed to integrate.
Not all of the acquisitions challenged by the Justice Department
have been invalidated by the courts. Although some of the judi-
cially approved acquisitions were evaluated after Brown Shoe, there
has been a tendency on the part of the finders of fact in these cases
to consider the economic consequences of the acquisition rather than
undertake an analysis of the market conditions and of the degree
of foreclosure. 3
One recent vertical acquisition84 that has received judicial bless-
ing was the purchase by Tidewater Oil and by Pan-American Petro-
leum, a wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Oil, of the gas and oil
producing property of Honolulu Oil Company which was in the
process of liquidation. This acquisition was unusual in two re-
spects: (1) this was a "backward vertical" merger rather than the
typical "forward vertical" integration that has characterized the de-
velopment of most major oil companies; (2) this purchase was at
a time when there was a glut on the oil market. The government
challenged the purchase under section 1 of the Sherman Act and
section 7 of the Clayton Act. The line of commerce which was
held to be relevant was the crude oil and natural gas market for the
82 231 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
8 United States v. Standard Oil Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 5 71215
at 79841 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 1964)
84 Ibd.
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whole United States. The court held that the acquired gas and oil
reserves constituted only a de mimmus supply when considered in
this line of commerce. The crude oil of Honolulu accounted for
only .10 per cent of domestic refinery consumption and .51 per
cent of all domestic crude oil production and .45 per cent of the
total proven reserves in the United States. The trial court noted
the oil glut and the decline of oil reserves of the twenty largest oil
firms.8" The structure of the industry was found to be competitive
on the basis of evidence of easy entry into the crude oil production
market.
Of interest is the fact that the government introduced no wit-
nesses from the oil industry who could testify to the ant-competitive
effects of the acquisition, whereas the defendants' witnesses testified
to the absence of an adverse effect and to consumer benefits. Con-
sidering the competitive atmosphere prevalent in, the industry, the
minimal amount involved in the acquisition and the lack of anti-
competitive evidence, the court held that the acquisition, was legal.
Another recent victory for firms desiring to integrate vertically
was the approval by a Texas District Court of the acquisition by
National Steel Corporation of one of the leading manufacturers of
pre-fabricated metal buildings in the southwestern United States."6
The court after reviewing the voluminous exhibits submitted by the
parties, concluded that the acqusition was legal. The decision did not
refer specifically to precedent but instead succinctly applied a test
similar to that enunciated in Brown Shoe."r Thus, Brown Shoe
generally is still the main defimtive decision involving vertical
acquisitions and the primary source of legal guidelines in this area.
In summary, the development of social control over vertical
acquisitions reached its judicial maturity in Brown Shoe which rec-
ognized vertical acquisitions as requiring special legal principles.
Rome Cable should be regarded as an erroneous application of hori-
zontal principles to a vertical problem. On this threshold of legal
maturity, it is advisable to re-examine the economic and social foun-
dation of the criteria of legality for vertical combinations. In par-
ticular, the relationship between law and economics should be
g5 From 1946 to 1960, the crude reserves of the 20 largest oil companies declined
from 52.1% to 49.6% of total crude oil reserves. Some major oil companies have re-
cently encountered extreme difficulty resulting from the lack of proven reserves.
88 Unted States v. National Steel Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.)
5 71375, at 80604 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 1965).
871d. at 80609..
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examined to see if the legal consensus represented by Brown Shoe
is economically sensible.
IV THE ECONOMIC RAMIFICATIONS
OF VERTICAL ACQUISITIONS
Often those working in a special area of social control, such as
trade regulation, become so immersed in the existing Institutions
that they fail to periodically reconsider the concepts underlying
these institutions in light of changing conditions. It is submitted
that such reconsideration is necessary with regard to some of the
economc effects of the legal prohibitions of the antitrust laws,
specifically section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The legal standard of "substantially lessening competition"
which is enunciated in section 7 and its application have evolved
into a modified "rule of reason" as exemplified by Brown Shoe; but
how much economic "reason" is involved in the application of this
rule? Before such reasonableness may be ascertained, it is neces-
sary to analyze the sacred cow "competition," which is fundamental
to the so-called modified rule of reason under section 7.
The term "competition" has been bandied about with eloquent
dexterity by the legal profession, jurists, economists, professors and
businessmen." There are many technical definitions of competi-
tion - perfect and imperfect competition, "workable" competition,
monopolistic competition, duopoly, monopsony, and oligopoly, to
name but a few Competition is but a generic concept which em-
braces all of these variants of market structure. Competition in its
generic sense is the degree to which firms in the same market
area vie for the favor of the purchaser of their product.8" To speak
of economic competition in terms of ease of entry,"0 absence of
market power,9l or a lack of control over price92 is to improperly
8 8 ATi'y. GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTrnusT REP. 320-39 (1955); MASSEL, CoMPE-
TITiON AND MONOPOLY 186-233 (1962); Adelman, Effective Competition and the
Antitruit Laws, 61 HARv. L REv. 1289 (1948); Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable
Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940)
89 ATT'Y. GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 320-39 (1955); BACH, ECONOMIcs
444-76 (3d ed. 1957)
90 BAIN, BARRImRs TO NEw COMPETION (1956). See also, Modigliam, New
Developments on the Oligopoly Front, 66 J. POL. ECON. 215 (1958).
91 See generally MACHLuP, THE EcoNoMIcs OF SELLER'S COMPm'ETTION (1952);
Adelman, Concept and Statistical Measurement of Vertical Integration, in BusINSS
CONCETRATION AND PRICE POLICY 281 (1955)
92 Scztovsky, Economic Theory and the Measurement of Concentration, in BusNwm
CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 101 (1955) For a technical analysis, see CHAM-
BERLIN, TOWARD A MORE GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE (1957).
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add a built-in measuring rod to the definition of economic competi-
tion. Ease of entry, market power and degree of control over price
are only characteristics of the market area in which the firms oper-
ate.
In the drafting of the amended section 7, the legislators relied
heavily on two FTC reports"3 which indicated that the largest firms
controlled a substantial portion of the manufacturing assets in the
United States."' The reports concluded that concentration tended to
decrease the vigor of price competition and the aggressiveness of
these larger corporations.95 The legislators in the enactment of the
Clayton Act and its subsequent amendment sought to curb this
economic concentration by preventing acquisitions that could create
such power.
Concentration is defined as the distribution of economic control
in a specific horizontal level of commerce. 8 Control over concen-
trauons of economic power differs fundamentally from the promo.
tion of a competitive market unless a definite causal relation can be
demonstrated between accumulated economic power and the vigor
of the competitive atmosphere. Concentration in absence of such
proof is but a description of the market structure whereas competi-
tion - in its generic sense - denotes the degree to which competi-
tors seek the favor of the buyer.
Because of the basic distinction between competition and con.
centration, it is reasonable to ask: is concentration a proper test of
the economic effect of vertical integration? If a producer and a
fabricator merge, both initially maintain their relative standing in
their respective markets. One of the primary ways to improve that
standing is to cut prices, assuming the integration will permit such
93 FTC, The Present Trend of Corporate Mergers and Acqussitons, S. Doc. No. 17,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1947).
94 This is quite evident by reference to S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.(1950). For a general reference, see Bodner, Vertical Mergers Under Sectton Seven,
22 A.B.A. ANTIThUSr SECEION 106 (1964)
95 An appraisal of this report does not reveal the causal link between "bigness" and
lack of price competition. The references to concentration breeding lethargy were to
industries where there was only one substantial firm in the market. The statistics gath-
ered seemed to be outdated.
06 Concentration, as used in this article, is the share of the market accounted for by
the largest firms in that particular marker. The dimension of the companies' activities
may be measured by such criteria as output, sales, assets, or employment. Concentra-
ton does not mean the share of economic activity accounted for by the large companies
in the economy as a whole. MASON, EcONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONoPO-
LY PROBLEM 16-18 (1957). The economic theory of market concentration has been
ably demonstrated by CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION(1933) and by ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETION (1933).
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reductions. Their competitors can respond either with a price re-
duction or by some other sales device such as advertising contests,
or better service or can choose not to respond and suffer the result-
ing loss of sales. In all cases, the net return on assets for the com-
bined firms would be reduced unless cost savings could be achieved
by increased volume. Note that an integrated unit would probably
also have a reduced return on its assets in spite of its size. On the
other hand, if the price is determined by horizontal factors, the in-
tegrated fabricator could not charge a higher price than if it were an
independent fabricator. Price is determined by factors on the hori-
zontal level and will probably be at, the point at which marginal
cost equals marginal revenue. It can be concluded that vertical in-
tegration does not imply a power over price unless cost savings can
be achieved.
The argument is often advanced against vertical acquisitions
that such integration will enable the .firm to reduce its price on one
tier in order to expand its share of the market on that level. As-
suming that.the economic units desire to maximize their profit, this
"deep pocket" argument is valid only if (1) the economies of scale
are-sufficient to permit greater total profit, or (2) other integrated
firms are. unable to achieve such economies. Furthermore, to re-
duce prices on one level without a corresponding cost decrease would
tend to lower the return on assets and the total profit of the venture.
The final phase of the "deep pockets" argument is that price re-
ductions on one level subsidized by other tiers will eliminate com-
petitors. But such reduction is possible only if entry into that level
is relatively difficult because exploitation of a dominant market posi-
tion in the form of raised prices and accompanying profits would at-
tract new entrants. If entry is difficult, then the vertically inte-
grated firm must have expended substantial resources to enter the
new tier and a higher rate of return might be economically justi-
fiable.
Assuming concentration is the applicable test for vertical inte-
gration, which this writer questions, the question then arises as to
whether the absence of concentration actually encourages beneficial
economic consequences? An economist, desiring to demonstrate
the results obtainable in a situation where economic units are numer-
ous and of approximately equal size, would cite the classical model
of perfect competition." The existence of this model economic
97 An excellent interpretation of this model may be obtained from SAMUELSON,
ECONoMics 441-50 (3d ed. 1955).
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structure would theoretically yield the following consequences: "
(1) Price - the consumer would be able to purchase the product
at the lowest price; (2) Output - the desires of the consumer
would be immediately satisfied; (3) Technological advances - the
technological progress would proceed at the fastest pace; (4) Prof-
its - would be sufficiently high to insure the investment of suf-
ficient economic capital. Unfortunately, such a model has never
existed and probably will never become a reality. The importance
of this classical model lies in its economic goals. Thus, to deter-
mine the degree of competition desired in a given line of commerce,
the economic results obtainable at such a level of competion might
be projected and evaluated. This approach contrasts sharply from
that used to legally evaluate a partacular market structure, oe., an
examination of the resultant degree of foreclosure and concentra-
tion. This economic analysis of consequences is a pragmatic ap-
proach which is built on the premise-that "that which works is
good."09  I
A determination of the economic effect of a vertical acquisition
would normally include a study of the factors shown in the follow-
ing table: °
(1) Price
(a) The economies v. the diseconomies of scale
(b) The possibility of reducing market expense(c) The possibility of 'eliminating transfer costs
(d) The potential reduction of inventory
(e) The possible lower initial costs of vertaci1 entry into
the market
(f) The ability to wage price competition
(2) Output
(a) Assured sources of supply
(b) Captive outlets for lowet tier
(c) Degree of utilization of capacity
9 8 BAcI, op. cit. sfupra note 89, at 407..
0 9 This sounds quite similar to that paragon of virtues, "workable competition",
however, it differs fundamentally as "wvorkable" or "effective" competition attempts to
identify the conditions which provide the substance of advantageous competition. The
analysis suggested in this paper is first focused on the results of an acquisition, and the
condition that characterize the market at the stage of optimum economic result are the
"workable" competition for that market. ATT'Y. GEN. NA'il COMML ANTITRUST
REP. 320-39 (1955). Bain, Workable Competition in Oligopoly: Theoretical Consider-
ations and Some Empirical Evidence, 40-2 AM. ECON. REV. 35 (1950); see generally,
STOCKING, WORKABLE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST POLICY (1961)
100 For more detailed analyses of the economic consequences of vertical integration
see: Adelnan, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARW. L REV. 27 (1949); Bork,
Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Miscon-
ception, 22 U. CHI. L REv. 157 (1954); Frank, The Significance of Industrial Integra-
tion, 33 J. POL. ECON. 179 (1925).
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(d) Possibilities for quality control
(3) Technological Advances(a) Degree to which resources are properly allocated
(b) Possible loss of flexibility on lower tier(c) The combined resources for increased research and
development
(4) Profit
(a) Spread of economic risk in several markets v. increas-
ing the economic risk
(b) Access to new financing
(c) Increased ability to control price
These represent most of the factors that an economist would evalu-
ate under an economic "rule of reason" to determine resulting
economic benefits or detriments of a vertical acquisition. It is ap-
parent that the economist's rule of reason differs fundamentally
from the rule propounded by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe.'
First, economies of scale and cost reductions have been specifi-
cally rejected as not pertinent to a determination of the legality of
an acquisition under Brown Shoe. Considering solely economic
consequences, such cost savings may be passed on to the consumer
in the form of reduced prices or increased quality, or may be retained
as profits or may be divided to yield both a price reduction and an
increase in surplus. It should be noted that if the profits achieved
by vertically integrated units are excessive,102 other firms will be
tempted to integrate. Thus, to maintain their market position, the
previously integrated firms would be forced to reduce their prices
to meet competition from the new entrants or keep their profits at
a level to discourage new entrants.
Second, foreclosure of competitors has been viewed as a major
evil under many judicial interpretations.0 3 It is reasoned that the
competitors on one tier are prevented from selling to or purchasing
from the acquired firm on another tier with a resultant injury to
competition. This might be a valid approach if there were not al-
ready existing integrated corporations which were able to achieve
their present status through the expenditure of their own resources
to expand their facilities. To prevent integration by acquisition
101 The difference between law and economics is nothing new and has been widely
discussed. Avr'y. GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTiTRusr REp. 339-41 (1955); DEWEY,
MONOPOLY IN LAW AND EcoNoMics (1958); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and
the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HAxv. L. REv. 226 (1960); Massel, Legal and
Economic Aspects of Competition, 1960 DuKE L.J. 157 (1960)
102 Note also that accumulated earnings which are not distributed to shareholders of
the corporation are subjected to a tax under INT. Rsv. CODE OF 1954, § 531.
108 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1961).
[Vol 17:102
VERTICAL ACQUISITIONS
would not only increase the cost of combining several stages, but
would also serve to protect existing integrated units and concentra-
tions of economic power. On the other hand, permitting vertical
acquisition would enable smaller, aggressive units to challenge the
existing or potential giants and to serve as a force to sustain a com-
petitive atmosphere.
It must also be recognized that the foreclosure concept is dedi-
cated to the protection of individual competitors. Protection of
competitors should not be confused with the encouragement of com-
petition. From an economic standpoint, valid requirement or out-
put contracts can accomplish the same results as an acquisition; °.
thus there is no reason to deny flexibility to all competitors. All
are aware that some companies fail financially - this is an accepted
fact in the business community. For a judicial body to extend its
protective cloak over competitors is to stifle certain phases of com-
petition. Competition by its nature implies that some competitor
must eventually lose; however, the consumer is the ultimate win-
ner.
Finally, the Supreme Court is dear in its condemnation of acqui-
sitions which are part of an integration trend within a particular in-
dustry." 5 From an economic standpoint, it is logical that the only
firms which will normally be able to compete on the same basis
with the previously integrated corporations will be those that can
integrate vertically. To deny the benefits of integration to a smaller
firm that is in the same relevant line of commerce with larger in-
tegrated companies, would be to encourage and protect existing con-
centration and promote the creation of monopolies. The presence
of other comparable units will tend to strengthen the competitive at-
mosphere and, in the absence of horizontal conspiracies to regulate
prices, the consumer would receive the benefits of integration.
An application of these two divergent lines of reasoning, legal
and economic, to the acquisition of Bridgeport Brass by Alumnium
Ltd.,' results in contrasting conclusions as to the merits of the
acquisition. Under a solely economic test, the costs of the parties
are significantly reduced - (1) marketing and transfer costs are
eliminated; (2) Alumimnum Ltd.'s cost of entry is lowered; (3)
Aluminium Ltd.'s entry into the fabricating market presents an im-
20 4 See generally Kessler & Stem, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69
YALE Lj. 1 (1959); Mcdaren, Related Problems of "Requirements" Contracts and Ac-
qutsktions tn Vertical Integratron under the Antitrust Laws, 45 ILL L. REv. 141 (1950).
205 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1961)
106 See text accompanying notes 3-6 supra.
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mediate economic force in lowering prices. Such an occurrence is
a much more effective lever in the reduction of prices than is the
mere threat that Aluminium Ltd. might integrate forward. by build-
ing its own facilities. Aluminimr Ltd. now also 'has an assured
market for some of its production, and quality control becomes
easier. There is, of course, some loss of flexibility by the parties,
but there is an increase in funds available- to Bridgeport Brass for
technological innovation. The acquisition should turn an unprofit-
able fabricating operation into a potential money-maker. Ad-
mittedly, under , market structure approach, the combination would
create an economic force in the aluminum fabricating industry;
however, this -would tend to counterbalance the existing integrated
organizations. The government's allegation that 'the competitors
of, Aluminium Ltd. might be foreclosed from an outlet for their
product is of' questionable merit since the six major integrated
United States producers of aluminum control 80-per cent of the
total aluminum market.
If this example in the aluminum industry is any indication of
economic results. that spring from the application of the so-called
legal "rule of reason" enunciated in section 7, then from an eco-
nomic viewpoint, a re-examination of the presently-applied antatrust
concepts is necessary. This fresh look is imperative because the
courts and the trust-busters. have become so involved in the char-
acteristics of the market, that the practical results of a proposed
vertical acquisition have been overlooked. Originally, fragmenta-
tion was thought to produce the best economic results. It would be
folly for society to acceptthis economic principle without empiri-
cally evaluating the model in the modern business climate. Since
America is a nation of pragmatists, our economic policy makers
should be pragmatic in their regulation of business.
V SoCIAL ASPECTS OF, VERTICAL ACQUISITION
The reason given by the 'Sutpieme Court in the Brown Shoe case
for its apparent repudiation of economic results as guiding criteria
in determining the legality of the acquisition was the social desir-
ability of maintaining a fragmented, market, structure."'7 The
courts interpreted congressional intent'as favoring an- economic
model in which the individual units are of relatively small size and
are constantly competing for the consumer's business on relatively
equal terms. Undoubtedly, some of our legislators might have en-
107 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1961)
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visioned this type of economy at the turn of the century; however,
two world wars and fantastic technological changes today make
this theory as outdated as, the horse and buggy. Business is today
confronted by a formidable host of power groups, each seeking to
gain concessions at the expense of the other. Organizec labor is
accelerating its consolidation of economic power through an in-
creasing membership and by gains at the bargaining table and in
the halls of Congress. Labor is not hesitant to use its new-found
influences.
The twentieth century has witnessed not only the development
of corporate giants whose activities span the globe, but also the
formation of multi-nation economic blocs, all of which are engaged
in a race for the favor of international consumers. From an inter-
national perspective, th&United States must permit the organiza-
tion of effective industrial competitors which have the economic
strength -and techniques to successfully engage in this crucial con-
test. From a domestic viewpoint, there are now in existence ver-
tically integrated units in every sector of the economy. To prevent
competitors of these units from enjoying the benefits of vertical
integration would be to insulate the existing powers of economic
concentration, from competitive pressure.
The growth of the trength of federal and local governments
has created a political force within which the business community
must operate and exist. A symbiotic relationship must be present
between business and government for a nation to prosper. Cor-
porations are a major source of tax revenue and provide most of
the weapons and equipment for the nation's defense. A strong
economy is capable of furthering the government's policy of main-
taining stable prices and relatively low unemployment. In return
for its contributions to the nation's economy, business receives: (1)
protection in the form of patents, trademarks, an orderly securities
market, control of unfair competitive practices and other similar
devices; and (2) special favors such as tariffs, financing through the
Small Business Administration and other government agencies and
technological assistance. This relationship cannot function effec
tively if business units are rendered inefficient because of govern-
ment interference; in such cases business obviously cannot function
as a source of tax revenues or as a producer of equipment for gov-
ernment use.
Society is composed of a multitude of large and small forces
which constantly shift or coalesce while seeking to promote their
1965]
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own purposes. Regardless of the relative merits of such a system,
it remains the reality in which we live. If the government attempts
to regulate the potency and size of the .individual forces, then it must
also seek to regulate the remaining forces in order to develop coun-
tervailing powers within the economy. Such a task is not only
Herculean but would tend to run against the fiber of our traditional
concepts of government.
The important lesson to be learned from a discussion of the
above forces in our society is that bigness alone should not be held
to be evil per se. In fact, the power accompanying such a condi-
tion might be necessary under modern conditions. The arguments
pro. and con for recognition of a type of monopolistic competition
have been adequately detailed elsewhere."' 8 It is not the purpose of
this article to assert that all vertical acquisitions are socially bene-
ficial but rather to raise the hypothesis that not all such acquisitions
can be condemned as socially harmful merely because economic
power would result.
VI. CONCLUSION
From the preceding analysis, it is possible to recognize that un-
der the modified legal rule of reason as enunciated in Brown Shoe
and under the economists' guide to workable competition, economi-
cally beneficial combinations may .be thwarted through the blind
application of rigid rules. In an effort to safeguard those acquisi-
tions which may yield price reduction to the consumer, advance
technology and permit a more efficient allocation of resources, it
would be prudent to re-examine several fundamental antitrust con-
cepts:
A. Competton.-The type of competitive market struc-
ture consisting of numerous small units envisioned. by the legislators
drafting the Clayton Act and amended section 7 is not only out of
contact with modern conditions but also impractical from an eco-
nomic viewpoint. The advantages of monopolistic competition or
competition between large industrial units must be reconsidered by
the policy makers.
B. Economc Effect.-To evaluate the legality of a merger
or sale of assets under the antitrust laws, the economic conse-
quences such as price, output, technological advances and allocation
of resources should be determined and considered. The economic
108GALBRArIH, AMERICAN CAPITAUISM, THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING
POWER (1952).
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analysis should be shifted from a study of market conditions to a
determination of whether economic goals are satisfied.
C. Size.-The accumulation of economic power should not
be feared.' There are existing countervailing forces to regulate
the activities of any economic giant. Business regulation should be
directed at practices rather than structure.
D Guulelines.-The policy makers"0 should devise admims-
trative guidelines by which the businessman and his attorneys can
determine whether a proposed combination will be subject to chal-
lenge under either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act. Informal
conferences between the government and those seeking an acquisi-
tion should be held and should include a discussion of the economic
effects of proposed combination. The present system does not fully
inquire into all the ramifications of a merger or the sale of a busi-
ness.
It is only through self-analysis that the sacred cows and myths
that arise can be challenged and, if necessary, destroyed. It is pro-
posed here that a national committee be formed from all sectors
of the economy to re-examine the fundamental concepts underly-
ing the governmental regulation. This representative committee
should undertake an empirical appraisal of all facets of competition
and of competitive practices. This study should include all major
109 Perhaps, a new approach has already started. Donald F. Turner, in his first
public speech as chief of the Justice Department's antitrust division, said: "We should
not attack a merger simply because the companies are large in the absolute sense and
we should not attack aggressive but fair competitive conduct simply on the basis that
some competitors are hurt." On the other hand, he rejected the economic consequences
approach as he believes that a competitive market is the best way to help growth and
productivity. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 11, 1965, p. 3, col. 2.
110 The new antitrust division chief, Donald F. Turner, has recently announced the
creation of a 12-man staff headed by Edwin M. Zimmerman to formulate a set of guide-
lines to identify transactions that are violations of the acquisition provisions of § 7
This committee is to seek advice from the business community and from educators,
but the establishment of a business advisory group was rejected.
The probable outline of these guidelines was revealed by Mr. Turner in a panel
discussion at the annual meeting of the Federal Bar Association on Sept. 17, 1965. Mr.
Turner took the position that the guidelines would probably be based on the degree of
concentration in the industry under investigation. All economic factors wouldl be dis-
regarded. Accordingly, industry would be prevented from presenting the beneficial
results and the economic motivation of an acquisition. 219 ANTIRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. A-9 (Sept. 21, 1965). This view contrasts with the earlier view taken by Mr.
Turner in his initial statement upon assuming his present position. See note 109 supra.
However, it is very much in line with the opinions which Mr. Turner has expressed
on a previous occasion. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, 78 HARv. L REv. 1313, 1318-19 (1965). It is submitted that the formula-
tion of general guidelines for acqtusitions cannot be based on a single factor without
an expressed legislative directive or without a broad inquiry into the economic ram-
ficatons of such guidelines. See generally, Bock, Relaiwity of Economic Evidence in
Merger Cases - Emerging Decisions Force the Issue, 63 Mica. L. REv. 1355 (1965).
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industries with specific attention directed to the means by which
economic goals of low prices, technological progress and proper al-
location of resources can be achieved in each. Such a study could
serve as a factual background from which the courts and the govern-
ment could evolve a coherent policy for developing competition in
business. Law and economics must coalesce in this area; therefore,
such a study should concentrate on combining both legal and eco-
nomic analyses.
Only a socially mature society can indulge in introspective anal-
ysis and evaluation. It is imperative for America to develop and
maintain a vigorous and strong privately-owned economy. To
achieve this end, a logical and reasonable government policy for
business must be developed.
